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HALF A CENTURY OF FUZZY SETS 
W A L E N T Y O S T A S I E W I C Z 
Fuzzy sets conceived as mappings from X to [0,1], i.e. as a generalized characteristic functions with 
operations max, min, and subtraction-from-1 form a structure of De Morgan algebra, and as a such they 
have been introduced for the first time in 1940 by H. Weyl and independently, in much more elaborated 
form, by A. Kaplan and H. Schott in 1951. Recently the fuzzy sets were rediscovered by L. Zadeh and 
they have been developed in many directions by many researchers. An abstract De Morgan algebras 
have been introduced in 1935 by G.C. Moisil, generalized characteristic functions introduced in 1936 
by E. Szpilrajn have been also intensively studied in fifties by H. Rasiowa and R. Sikorski. 
So called fuzzy sets are t reated as a conceptualization of vagueness, or in other words 
as a formal tool to t reat precisely the phenomenon of vagueness. 
The problem of vagueness is a very old one. A discussions of it one may trace back to 
Greek antiquity. It is enough to remember the controversy concerning the definition of 
"man" given in Plato 's Academy, and the well-known paradox called "falakros". 
W. G. Leibniz, the last man who knew all things in the world, was probably the first 
one who has discussed the problems of vagueness and impreciseness in greater details, 
considering them as a properties of language (cf. [8]). 
L . E . J . Brouwer has also argued that any language is vague and prone to misunder-
s tanding. Even if not explicitly he has connected vagueness phenomenon with ancient 
principle of " ter t ium non da tur" . As early as 1908 he criticized the "long belief in the 
universal validity of the principle of excluded third", he has argued tha t in general one 
cannot expect a subset B of A to be decidable, i.e. for all x G A whether x £ B or 
x £ B (see [3]). 
The principle of excluded middle has been also criticized by J. Lukasiewicz, who 
argued that the principle of bivalence cannot be proved, one can only believe it , and he 
is alone who considers it self-evident to believe it (see [10]). His own a t t i t ude towards 
this principle was expressed as follows: "I am entitled not to recognize it, and to accept 
the view tha t besides t ru th and falsehood there exist other t ruth-values, including at 
least one more , the third truth-value" (cf. [10]). And in 1918 he communicated about 
the success in developing a new logical system. The famous about 50-lines article on 
three-valued logic was published in 1920 (see [12]). 
In the much cited article of B. Russell [15] we find once again tha t vagueness and its 
opposite - precision - are "characteristics which can only belong to representation, of 
which language is an example" (cf. [15]). 
Russell 's definition of vagueness by means of one-many relation between symbolizing 
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and symbolized systems has been criticized by M. Black, who following the Peirce's at-
t i tude prefers a pragmatical definition, arguing that indeterminacy in meaning of notion 
is due to usage but not its extension (see [1]). Undoubtedly his "consistency profile" 
must be considered as a first a t t empt to define what we know today as a membership 
function. 
Although B. Russell and M. Black differ in their philosophical points of view, they 
both, more or less explicitly, have grounded their considerations on questioned principle 
of excluded third. Like L. Brouwer and J. Lukasiewicz they do not want to exclude this 
third. For M. Black for example, the third was a region of doubtful application of a t e rm 
to objects. This region has been called "fringe". 
The problem of vagueness has been also investigated within the framework of ma the-
matics, where the central role plays the notion of "set", and which is used for definition 
of meaning (extension) of terms. The notion of "set" has been used (defined) for the first 
t ime by W. G. Leibniz, and the most widespread is a Cantorian conception to t reat a set 
as a collection of distinct objects. Followers of G. Frege equate a set with a property (set 
= Begriffsumfang). In the simplest case when properties are considered as a bivalent 
predicates, the family of all sentences of the type "x has a property P " is isomorphic 
with an algebra of all subsets {x |P (x )} of a given set X. The both forms the so called 
Boolean latt ice, and furthermore, they are isomorphic with a family of all characteristic 
functions V : X —* {0,1} introduced in 1936 by De la Vallee-Poussin with the following 
operat ions: 
VA(x)UVB(x) = xmx(VA(x), VB(x)) 
VA(x)DVB(x) = mm(VA(x), VB(x)), (*) 
VA(x) = 1 - VA(x). 
As early as 1940 H. Weyl has suggested to consider the grades of an extent to which an 
object x possesses a property under the study. These grades are interpreted as values 
of generalized predicate W : X —> [0,1] defined on a set X. On a family of all such 
predicates H. Weyl has defined the operations by formulas (*), generalizing in this way 
a notion of characteristic function. Such functions are known today as a fuzzy sets, 
and this seems to justify, at least partially, the title of this note. Besides this calculus 
(De Morgan algebra), H. Weyl has discussed some other formal s t ructures , particularly 
this one of q u a n t u m logic originated by G. Birhoff and J. von Neumann in 1936, and 
intensively studied in present days also within the framework of fuzzy sets theory. 
It is well known that Cantorian concept of the set was badly shaken by the antinomies, 
there are also well known three approaches to the problem of rebuilding the foundations 
of set theory proposed by L. E. J. Brouwer, B. Russell and E. Zermelo. Unfortunately less 
known is a system proposed by an eminent Polish logician S. Lesniewski. This system 
is called mereology, which has already been developed in 1916 (see [19]). It is not a 
logical theory because its terms and axioms cannot be deduced from the principles of 
logic, it is an adequate base not only for construction of contemporary mathemat ics bu t 
also for applications in other branches of sciences. This is mainly because in contrast 
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to classical theory of sets, the term class in the mereology considered in collective sense 
"says absolutely nothing about whether or not certain objects exist in the universe. One 
can employ it to relate different object, physical or not, provided that one believes in 
the existence, of these objects" (cf. [16]). 
The problem of developing a formal system which might provide a more adequate 
explication of classes in "their scientific use, i. e. as an actual or empirical classes has been 
resoled to a certain extent by A. Kaplan and H. Schott. In 1951 they published an article 
[4] presenting a calculus for empirical classes (CEC). Essentially, this calculus is identical 
with calculus of fuzzy sets thought of as mappings from a universe X to the unit interval. 
Membership function (indicator in CEC terminology) is defined as a composition of two 
mappings: one, from a given universe X into a set of properties, and the second, from 
properties space to the unit interval. Values of indicator determining an empirical class 
are called nominal probabilities, since they are supposed to be fixed only by convention. 
It is worth noticing tha t beside the basic operations (*) and the basic relations for 
empirical classes (fuzzy sets in today terminology) some "recent" results obtained in the 
theory of fuzzy sets are also considered in paper [4], for example a definition of quasi-
null and quasi-universal classes, idealization of a given class, sharpening relations, and 
similarity or sameness relations among meaning of terms. 
It is rather common opinion that vagueness is a property of language. At tempts to 
formalize this property surprisingly pertain chiefly not to language but to some domains 
beyond it. 
Seemingly the only exception is an interesting work of T. Kubiriski (cf. [5,6]). T. 
Kubiiiski has discussed in greater details three semiotical points of view on vagueness: 
pragmatical , syntactical, and semantical. He has developed an axiomatic system called 
quasi-ontology as a deductive theory of imprecise names. Very roughly speaking this 
system is a modification of Lesniewski's ontology, i.e. this is theory of expressions "x is 
A", which admit also a vague terms. 
Fuzzy sets are usually identified with generalized characteristic functions. It is worth 
noticing tha t generalized functions have been introduced by E. Szpilrajn as early as 
1936, chiefly for enabling logical comparisons between certain questions of point sets 
and questions belonging to the general theory of sets [17]. Various generalizations have 
been considered also by H. Rasiowa and R. Sikorski mainly as a tools for interpretat ions 
of formal theories (see [13,14]). 
Closing this extended abstract author wanted to express his grat i tude and indebted-
ness to J . Drewniak, K. Haagen, R Schonemann and Z. Switalski for their encouragement 
and for providing him with the l i terature. 
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